Is It Offensive?

Not with a whimper, just less bang than expected

Since before Victory Day, we have heard claims that the Ukrainians were about to go on the offensive. Likewise, you have read me make claims that Russia would begin an offensive around Victory Day. Given the hostilities of the last ten days, one must ask: is this the normal tempo of the war, or is there an increase in intensity?

We know that Russia has been hitting Ukraine with missile salvos every day since Victory Day. They are targeting air defense and munition stockpiles. This suggests that Russia wants to activate its air force. Right now, Russia is constrained to using glide bombs (https://www.rt.com/russia/575978-ukraine-glide-bombs-offensive/) to make up for a precision munitions shortage (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/3/russian-defence-minister-calls-for-missile-production-to-double). We saw that four Russian aircraft were downed recently (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/videos-show-helicopter-apparently-shot-down-russia-near-ukrainian-border-2023-05-13/), so we know that there is already an increase in Russian air activity.

Have we seen evidence of a Ukrainian offensive? Likely yes. The rout of the Russian 72nd Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade north of Bakhmut, (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-tanks-join-attacks-along-60-mile-front-russia-says-2023-05-12/) (https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/ukraine-says-it-routs-russian-brigade-kremlin-acknowledges-very-difficult-campaign/) (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/10/7401474/) (https://taskandpurpose.com/news/ukraine-russian-72nd-separate-motorized-rifle-brigade/) shows that Ukraine does have armored forces sufficient to attack Russian forces. Are they doing a reverse encirclement to cauldron the Russians who now hold Bakhmut? Maybe. But this doesn't seem like a good idea, given the force multiplier required by the Russians to take the city in the first place. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bakhmut) More likely, this was the promised relief offensive promised a month ago. Optics for a battle already lost.

The Ukrainian offensive was stymied before it even started. (https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/05/12/a-renewed-push-on-bakhmut-fuels-rumours-of-a-ukrainian-counter-offensive) The British supplied Storm Shadow missiles and Depleted Uranium ammo were blown up in the Khmelnytskyi missile attack. (https://newindian.in/gamma-radiation-spikes-as-explosions-rock-munitions-depot-in-ukraine/) Since we already know Ukraine has had ammunition shortages, these are crippling hits.

Russia must seize control of the aerospace domain if it wants to mobilize its huge air force without suffering more shoot-downs. That means destroying anti-air installations. (https://tass.com/defense/1619127) Russia lacks precision munitions so it is dependent on glide-bombs to support its front-line, since these upgrade kits are so cheap to manufacture (https://www.rt.com/russia/575978-ukraine-glide-bombs-offensive/). That means Russia's air-force must stay beyond the reach of Ukraine's air defense forces and cannot safely hit targets much beyond the front line.

Is it an offensive? Sure. Both sides are attacking with everything they've got, it's just not enough. Ukraine tried to mobilize for an offensive south of Kherson last month, but its armor was destroyed by Russian artillery. This is why Ukraine desperately landed on the other side of the Dniper a few weeks ago; in order to create defensive space so Ukrainian armor could safely accumulate around Kherson without getting hit. But they already lost more armor than NATO recently pledged and has not fully delivered. And their Depleted Uranium ammo was blown up in the Khmelnytskyi strike, so it's seems likely that the offensive has already been crippled before it even began.

The Russian lines south of Zaporizhzhia are some of the most fortified areas of the front line. Going to be hard to break through without ammunition, fuel, and parts. As Meduza points out, (https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/05/18/the-shape-of-things-to-come) there are only two choices: go for a breakthrough south of Zaporizhzhia or hit Russia everywhere at once. Since troop concentrations cannot get the supplies they need, due to Russian missile strikes, the all around offensive seems more likely. That won't go great either, as we've seen how much artillery is required to succeed.

As for Russia's offensive? Russia can only do so much if it wants to destroy Ukraine's air defense systems. It's not going to deploy its air force until Ukrainian anti-air is defeated. Otherwise Russia would suffer catastrophic, irreplaceable losses. In a war of attrition, it's more important to make your opponent spend more than you're spending per engagement... and ideally more than it can afford. So it's attrition warfare with convicts, mercenaries (https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/05/16/it-s-not-just-wagner), and Chechens in Bakhmut; and missile attacks and stand-off precision bombing until Ukrainian air defense is destroyed. (https://tass.com/defense/1620089) (https://tass.com/politics/1619527) (https://tass.com/defense/1618275).

It seems that Russia's new conscripts are on the front line getting seasoning. Better to learn to fight war on the defensive rather than offensive. Meanwhile, Russia will keep mobilizing more manpower (https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/06/anything-but-more-mobilization-russias-stealthy-push-to-find-more-soldiers-a80732) and ramping up its arms production. As soon as Russia achieves total air superiority, one should expect the land offensive to follow. It's not very cinematic, but it seems likely that the offensive has already started for both sides.